ist tradition" is not as uniform as superficial impressions suggest, but my limited investigation indicates that Protestantism was either characterized in the mode of the quotation or blithely ignored. Whether Protestant views of Catholic moral theology were any subtler or more sophisticated than Koch-Preuss on Protestantism is a matter I shall attend to with admittedly selective evidences. The publication dates do not all fit precisely the prenativity of Theological Studies, but all precede Vatican II.
For the reader with only modest knowledge of Protestant and Roman Catholic theology, there are no big surprises forthcoming from this investigation. Most of the attention is on the theological level, i.e. on doctrinal questions that have been controverted since the Reformation. This level is intricately intertwined with the philosophical level; charges of distortions of theology and ethics because of the influence of Aristotelian, and to some extent Stoic, philosophy create both theological issues such as the relations between God and creation, and ethical issues such as the foundations of morality and the understanding of human persons. There are some, but remarkably few, discussions of differences on particular moral questions. All this reflects a conventional Protestant theological agenda, and also how ethics, in the context of Protestant theology, was more integrated into systematic theology than was the case in the Roman Catholic tradition with its sharper distinction between the areas of theological research and writing.
The relation of moral philosophy to moral theology or theological ethics is the fulcrum on which swing both the relatively extended discussions published by Karl Barth. His polemic is, however, directed more toward "neo-Protestantism" than toward Roman Catholicism. Indeed, on this point he wrote: "And if we were compelled to choose between the Neo-Protestant and the Roman Catholic solutions, in this as in so many other questions we should have no option but to prefer the latter."
2 At an earlier time he described Roman Catholic moral theology as a "bold union of Aristotle and Augustine," and after a very nonjudgmental summary of what he perceived to be the major features of this synthesis he lines out the issues: "Between the Roman Catholic view and our own stands a difference in the concept of God, of man, of the sin of man, and grace which comes of him." 3 While there is formal agreement on the definition of relations between moral philosophy and moral theology, the "intention and character" of the definition is materially very different.
Underlying the issues is "the fundamental Roman Catholic conception of the harmony, rooted in the concept of being, between nature and supernature, nature and grace, reason and revelation, man and God." 4 The order of being is the common presupposition in both philosophy and theology; metaphysics is "a basic discipline superior to both philosophy and theology." Barth's queries are epistemological, but freighted with theological and ethical implications. "Where and how," he asks, "is God knowable and given to us in his being and not in and as his act?" 5 In Catholic moral theology God seems to be grasped as an entity that humans can master, and such an entity does not deserve to be called God. It is impermissible, for Barth, to construct the order of obligation on the order of being, for then human beings have derived the obligation; it is grounded in human activity and not in the command of God. "Does not its command have to be one and the same as the divine act of commanding; indeed as the divine commanding itself?" Emil Brunner is particularly interesting on this point, since his systematic ethics combines a view of divine commands with a structure of orders of creation. If sin has corrupted all spheres of life-which he believes Thomas Aquinas and the Fathers hold at least about the economic order-then one must be wary of identifying any given historical order 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 31. 6 Ibid. Cf. Barth, Church Dogmatics 2/2, 530 on the theme of harmony, and 532-33 on the issue of human derivation of obligations. On the latter: "From the very outset man is assured of a right of consultation and control in God's command. Whatever else it may be and mean for him, it can never become for him a command that affects him personally and binds him unconditionally." What is common between the 1928 lectures and Church Dogmatics 2/2 is the priority of divine act over being, and thus the language of divine commands. The latter discussion bears more marks of Barth's developed Christocentric theology; in Jesus Christ a divinely imperative obligation is part of the "divine act of the world's reconciliation with God as the act of His pure goodness" (532).
7 See, e.g., Barth's discussion of casuistry as a procedure in Church Dogmatics 3/4 (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1961) 6-19, and the application of his criticism throughout his discussion of issues of taking human life (397-407).
with the divine order. He charges that "modern Catholics" ignore this point. "Their idea of 'the Law of Nature' is so fully adapted to the actual state of things-think for instance of their doctrine of private propertythat the contradiction either disappears entirely, or is concealed by the formula: Out of consideration for special circumstances. ' " 8 Reinhold Niebuhr makes a similar charge, though in one of his discussions his research led him to a qualification often cited in recent Catholic moral theology. In the first volume of The Nature and Destiny of Man he wrote: "The social ethics of Thomas Aquinas embody the peculiarities and contingent factors of a feudal-agrarian economy into a system of fixed socio-ethical principles." 9 In Faith and History he wrote: "It is certainly dangerous to fill the 'natural law' with too many specific injunctions and prohibitions." In his footnote to this passage he aptly notes "that Thomas Aquinas had less specific content in his natural law than is found in modern Catholic theory," and cites the oft-quoted passage from Summa theobgiae 1-2, q. 94, a. 4, pertaining to defects as one descends from the common principle to the particular circumstances. 10 But Catholics are not the only ones who falsely absolutize the relative: "both Catholic and Protestant social theory tended to make the right of property much too absolute."
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Obviously backing the criticisms of absolutizing the relative are not only metaphysical and epistemological matters, but also a traditional Protestant view of sin, followed by correlative interpretations of grace. The discussion is, again, primarily on the theological level but has implications for ethics. For Barth the first consideration is, of course, grace, and sin is the second. For him human fellowship with God can be understood only as grace, which "rules out any attempt to snatch God's being beyond his act
We could no longer understand grace as grace ... if grace really shared its power with a capacity of our own nature and reason, if an ascent of man to God were really possible, and an order of obligation could exist, on the basis of a direct relation of man to God which grasps the divine being and thus bypasses grace." 12 The accuracy of this blunt insinuation directed to Catholic moral theology, of course, can be disputed, but the force of Barth's alternative frames a radically There is an air of Protestant conventionality about the discussions of sin and its outcome for ethics. The Lutheran Werner Elert, for example, summarizes Catholicism in a way one could cite from many other sources: "In the final analysis, guilt consists only in the fact that man, who in things natural has remained essentially unharmed, suffers from one deficiency."
14 Reinhold Niebuhr states that the "official Catholic doctrine of original sin" does not differ greatly from Pelagianism. By its distinction between pura naturalia, the essential nature of humans, and a donum superadditum it incorporates the biblical idea of the Fall without dealing with the corruption of the essential nature of the human. 15 Various writers are more or less nuanced in their interpretations of sin in Roman Catholicism, and various citations from Aquinas are used to support their views. But the inference for ethics is generally the same: the Catholic doctrine of sin leaves too much confidence in human beings to know and do the right and the good.
Citation from St. Thomas is always interesting to observe. I found no Protestants who are worried about excessive claims of human capacity citing the following passage: "Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, namely, so as to be shorn of every good of nature, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, perform some particular good, such as building dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing."
16 And all Protestant scholars surely knew that Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon, and others conceded that human capacities were present in a sufficient way to function in the civil use of the law. One can wonder to what extent the matter in hand has been, at least for some authors, a theological and religious one, i.e. a defense of salvation by grace alone so that no moral effectiveness could count toward the restoration of human relations to God. Or, whether the concern was more ethical in character, i.e. overweening confidence in human judgments 13 Barth, Ethics 32. The discussions of sin in Church Dogmatics are, I believe, fundamentally consistent with this earlier discussion, but also set in different context because of the elaboration of the significance of a gracious God for moral life. 14 about moral matters. The term "legalism" appears with frequency in some of the literature, and it seems to bear on both of these concerns. "Merit" is often the focus of attention.
Protestant theologians did not, on the whole, interpret Catholic moral theology as radically Pelagian, though certainly some popular Protestant interpretations did. Helmut Thielicke, e.g., writes "that Thomism does not present the doctrine of justification in such crude and deistic fashion that Christ is, as it were, only the initiator of justification, and that then, having started the movement, he withdraws ... and leaves everything to the human action " 17 Thomism, he says very fairly, regards all merits attained by human beings as merits only through grace. Anders Nygren, whose Agape and Eros influenced many Protestant authors, wrote: "Mediaeval theology is a theology of merit. But this does not mean that it is not at the same time a theology of grace."
18 What Catholicism does is regard merit and grace as one, while from the Evangelical view they exclude each other.
One might think that the controversy over grace and merit would be of little interest to ethicians; the issue is primarily about how one is saved. But such thought would be a gross error, and ethical issues are joined between the traditions on this point. In the background is also the doctrine of habits and virtues that gives content to the view of the human in the Catholic tradition. Barth makes the charge with characteristic bluntness. The ethics of Aquinas as found in both parts of the second part of the Summa "has its basis in Aristotle and its crown and true scope in the religious life in the narrowest sense of the term, namely, the life of the clergyman and the monk." 19 One finds in Protestant literature charges of tendencies toward moral perfectionism, of a two-storeyed ethics, that result from traditional Catholic moral anthropology and cooperating grace. Reinhold Niebuhr's summary judgment, based on Thomas' Treatise on Grace, question 109, is not untypical. "The issue at stake here is whether man's historical existence is such that he can ever, by any discipline of reason or by any merit of grace, confront a divine judgment upon his life with an easy conscience. If he can it means that it is possible for a will centered in an individual ego to be brought into essential conformity with the will and power that governs all things. On this question the Catholic answer is a consistently affirmative one." Niebuhr cites from Thomas the necessity of continued divine help, but also the view that in the "redeemed state" human beings can be kept from mortal sin, "which is grounded in reason." "According to this formulation the conformity of the human to the divine will is well nigh absolute, and the only sin which remains is occasioned by vagrant impulses below the level of the will." In a kind of dialectical fashion, however, Niebuhr acknowledges the qualifications of this tendency in Thomas by quoting him: "Because man's will is not wholly subject to God it follows that there must be many disorders in the acts of reason." the will of God, but directly preaches of its fulfillment through Christ and our sharing in it"; and "Insofar as the Gospel does lay down demands, these do not mean demands for action that we must accomplish as leading to our salvation; but rather the Gospel demands are a counsel pointing out things we may venture to achieve as a fruit of our salvation." 25 In The discourse in these studies is basically on the theological level, and how theological judgments affect justifications of ethical principles, moral values, and the nature of human action. All three authors turn to classic sources in both traditions to formulate the issues, and all three take into account significant writers in theological ethics among their contemporaries. There is ample evidence that Protestants are also concerned about particular moral teachings of Catholics during the period represented by these authors, e.g. Paul Ramsey's work on just war, discussions of birth control, etc. A hypothesis I hazard, however, is that one finds an increasing tendency in the literature by both Protestant ethicians and Roman Catholic moral theologians to leave these critical theological matters in the background. There are exceptions, such as Bernard Häring's major writings, The Law of Christ and Free and Faithful, essays by Charles Curran, and others. A perusal of decades of "Notes on Moral Theology" in this journal, however, backs my hypothesis on the Catholic side.
Quite different from these three books is one that was especially important at the time of its publication, namely Edward Duff, S.J., The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches. Duffs book provides the best available survey of its topic through the early 1950s. His principal heuristic device utilizes J. H. Oldham's well-known distinction between the "ethic of inspiration" and an "ethic of ends." The former is aptly characterized by Duff: it "insists that the fundamental and characteristic Christian moral attitude is not obedience to fixed norms or to a moral code but a living response to a living person, a fellowship with God who is sovereignly free and whose Will is sought for a present personal decision." This was a commonly held biblical-theological view among Protestants. The latter, in his words, "is based on an idea of the proper ordering of society and its parts whose overall purposes and particular functions are discoverable by a rational examination of their nature and operations," a more Catholic position. He demonstrates how a tension between these two types of ethics was present in the development of the World Council's "social philosophy," 28 and notes how it issues in incoherence in social ethics. The purpose of the study, clearly, is not to examine various works by theologians; it is a thorough and judiciously fair assessment of somewhat unscholarly material. Not only its content but also the quite irenic spirit in which it is written marked a milestone in the conversation between the two traditions. The book aids the reader to see how matters discussed on the theological level make differences on the level not only of ethical theory but also of moral evaluations and prescriptions for society. 1960s find it natural to take account of publications from both traditions-sometimes in a polemical way and sometimes in an irenic way. Ecumenism generally has lost much of the vitality it had 20 years ago, but it is worth noting that on doctrinal matters efforts continue to overcome historic differences, e.g. on justification and sanctification, the sacraments, and biblical authority in theology. My impression is that no similarly concerted effort occurs on moral matters, on social-ethical issues, on matters of ethical method, and on theological aspects of ethics. Why this is the case I cannot fully explain.
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A partial explanation may be that within Roman Catholicism controversies have occurred which leave little time and effort for more ecumenical interests. To be sure, some Protestants have entered into these controversies as well. I have in mind not only divisions among Catholics on practical moral and social questions, but also on some quite recondite matters of method which are seen to warrant practical judgments, e.g. the principle of double effect, proportionalism, and "consequentialism." (The latter seems to be a venial, if not mortal, intellectual sin.) I believe one could fruitfully interpret these internal Catholic debates on the continuum known from the history of moral theology: from laxism through probabilism and its qualifications to rigorism. I also believe that underlying various positions taken are not only intellectual issues but pastoral concerns: for some persons a fear of opening the gates of a dam so that prevailing undesirable currents of modern culture are not contained, for others a concern for the turmoils of conscience and suffering that rigorism can create.
Another partial explanation is that Roman Catholic moral theologians necessarily have to deal with the controverted issue of magisterial authority. To establish a magisterium of moral theologians with relative independence from the official magisterium takes great effort and concentration of attention. Some moral theologians who, under other conditions, might have interests in ecumenism have been put on the intellectual and institutional defensive. 37 Ecclesiological issues, and not only issues of ecclesiastical authority, have to be faced, e.g. that of who among the People of God are to participate in the formation of official moral teachings. Whose experiences ought to be taken into account? Perhaps 36 In November 1987, Loyola University of Chicago sponsored a series of papers and a one-day symposium on Joseph Cardinal Bernardina "consistent ethic of life." One paper was written by a Protestant, but it was noteworthy that in the discussion no interest was shown in ecumenical consensus. The concentration of discussion was on matters quite internal to Roman Catholic moral theology. 37 Protestants have been reluctant to publish a great deal on these matters for fear of making life more difficult for their Catholic friends.
38
There is no significant evidence that Protestant writers in ethics are any more interested in focusing attention on ecumenical consensus, per se, than are Roman Catholics. Where one finds a confluence of thinking, it is directed more by practical matters than by matters philosophical and theological. Evidence for this can be adduced from literature on liberation theology and ethics, feminist theology and ethics, and matters of human sexuality. Perhaps informal clusters of unity on such items have developed, and ecumenism among the participants is a by-product. My impression, however, is that at least some important intellectual issues, both theological and philosophical, are bypassed. 
